I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. This document discusses several ways that DHCPv6 can be used with Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA), pointing out benefits and concerns. While the document does discuss security issues in several places, it often lapses into vague terminology like "one should carefully consider the impact on security". Given that the primary benefit of using CGAs is to improve security by providing address validation without complex key distribution, carefully analyzing security issues seems necessary for this document. On the other hand, the Document Shepherd Write-up for this document says "The WG was not very energetic on this document. The document describes possible applications of CGAs and DHCP interaction and when the WG was asked whether there was enough interest to work on solutions, the reply was silence. As such, the consensus is based on most of the WG being indifferent." So maybe this document is only intended as a sketch of possible issues that can be explored later in a more in-depth document if someone is interested in doing so. If that's the case, maybe it's OK to not fully analyze all the security implications. However, in that case, I think the Security Considerations section should state clearly that this document does not contain a complete security analysis and any further work in this area should include such an analysis. Nobody should implement the techniques described in this document without conducting that more thorough analysis. I noticed a few typos. On page 6, the word "certificated" should be "certified". Three sentences later, "depend on policies" should be "depending on policies". And the draft names in the Change Log say "dhacpv6" instead of "dhcpv6". Thanks, Steve