Yaov, Tero, Paul and Daniel I have reviewed this document as part of the Operational directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written with the intent of improving the operational aspects of the IETF drafts. Comments that are not addressed in last call may be included in AD reviews during the IESG review. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. Status: Read for publication with editorial nits (see below) General Comment: Thank you for this interesting, informative, and well-written draft. My editorial nits are just places you might improve the clarity of the draft. Sue Hares ======================= Editorial Nits: #1 – Section 1.3, p 4, paragraph 1 Old/The recommendations of this document mostly target IKEv2 implementers as implementations need to meet both high security expectations as well as high interoperability between various vendors and with different versions. / New: /The recommendations of this document mostly target IKEv2 implementation as implementations need to meet both high security expectations as well as high interoperability between various vendors and with different versions. / Note: Either implementation as implementations Or implementers as implementers need to create implementations #2 – section 1.3, p. 4,paragraph 2 3) Old/ This document does not give any recommendations for the use of algorithms, it only gives implementation recommendations for implementations./ New / This document does not give any recommendations for the use of algorithms, it only gives implementation recommendations regarding implementations./ #3 section 3.1, p. 6 , paragraph 2, starting with “ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305” Please expand the abbreviation CRFG. I believe this this is the first use of the abbreviation. #4 section 3.4, p 9-10, several paragraphs in here did not provide the final status 4.a p9, last paragraph on page old/ Group 14 or 2048-bit MODP Group is raised from SHOULD+ in RFC4307 as a replacement for 1024-bit MODP Group. / new/ Group 14 or 2048-bit MODP Group is raised from SHOULD+ in RFC4307 to MUST as a replacement for 1024-bit MODP Group. / 4.b p. 9, first paragraph on page, line 1 Old/ Group 19 or 256-bit random ECP group was not specified in RFC4307, as this group were not defined at that time. Group 19 is widely implemented and considered secure./ New / Group 19 or 256-bit random ECP group was not specified in RFC4307, as this group were not defined at that time. Group 19 is widely implemented and considered secure so Group 19’s status is SHOULD. 4.c p.9, paragraph 4, line Old/ Group 1 or 768-bit MODP Group was not mentioned in RFC4307 and so its status was MAY. It can be broken within hours using cheap of-the- shelves hardware. It provides no security whatsoever./ New/ Group 1 or 768-bit MODP Group was not mentioned in RFC4307 and so its status was MAY. It can be broken within hours using cheap of-the- shelves hardware. It provides no security whatsoever. Therefore, its current stsatus is MUST not. #5 section 4.1, p 12, paragraph 2-4: Final status not indicatd 5.a: paragraph 2 Old/ Shared Key Message Integrity Code is widely deployed and mandatory to implement in the IKEv2 in the RFC7296./ New:/ Shared Key Message Integrity Code is widely deployed and mandatory to implement in the IKEv2 in the RFC7296. The status is MUST. / 5.b paragraph 3 Old/ ECDSA based Authentication Methods are also expected to be downgraded as it does not provide hash function agility. Instead, ECDSA (like RSA) is expected to be performed using the generic Digital Signature method. / New/ ECDSA based Authentication Methods are also expected to be downgraded as it does not provide hash function agility. Instead, ECDSA (like RSA) is expected to be performed using the generic Digital Signature method. ECADSA-based Authentication Methods status is “SHOULD”. / 5.c. paragraph 4 Old:/ DSS Digital Signature is bound to SHA-1 and has the same level of security as 1024-bit RSA. It is expected to be downgraded to MUST NOT in the future./ New/ DSS Digital Signature is bound to SHA-1 and has the same level of security as 1024-bit RSA. It is currently at SHOULD NOT, but it is expected to be downgraded to MUST NOT in the future./ 5.d paragraph 5 Old/ Digital Signature [RFC7427] is expected to be promoted as it provides hash function, signature format and algorithm agility./ New/ Digital Signature [RFC7427] is expected to be promoted as it provides hash function, signature format and algorithm agility. Its current status is SHOULD./