I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. This document describes how to map IP multicast trees to the point-to-multipoint label switched paths. This document uses lots of protocols that I have no idea about, so I have no idea whether there are real problems or not. The security considerations section consist of this text: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. Security Considerations All the security considerations for mLDP ([RFC6388]) apply here. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The security considerations section of RFC6388 point to the security considerations of the RFC5036 and states: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The protocol specified in this document does not provide any authorization mechanism for controlling the set of LSRs that may join a given MP LSP. If such authorization is desirable, additional mechanisms, outside the scope of this document, are needed. Note that authorization policies cannot be implemented and/or configured solely at the root node of the LSP, because the root node does not learn the identities of all the leaf nodes. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Which would indicate that there is no way to secure the Transit IPv{4,6} Shared Tree TLVs defined in this draft. Those TLVs specify Rendezvous Point for the multicast group. I have no idea whether some kind of attacks can be done if unauthorized peer sends such messages and for example tries to do some kind of denial of service attack against someone else by forwarding lots of multicast trafic to peer who does not want it. Or I might be completely misunderstood what is going on here... -- kivinen at iki.fi