From msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!nwnexus!coho!latimer Tue Apr 5 08:58:50 1994 Path: msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!nwnexus!coho!latimer From: latimer@coho.halcyon.com (Philip B. Latimer) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: New Algorthim Available for Peer Review Date: 5 Apr 1994 04:38:01 GMT Organization: dan.nelles@ablelink.org Lines: 266 Distribution: na Message-ID: <2nqpv9$rhb@nwfocus.wa.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: coho.halcyon.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Special Announcement to all Internet sci.crypt Conference Participants ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Re: The Data Encryption Algorithm, DEA Release v.2.01 / 2.02 / 2.03 A. New Cryptographic Product - DEA - [New Name [NDISA]] B. Complimentary Professional Peer Review Package - PRP - Published by: Nellis du Maurier Information Security 33 Isabella St., Ste. 1005 Toronto, ON M4Y 2P7 CANADA Internet E-Mail: Dan Nelles: dan.nelles@ablelink.org Availability: ------------- DEA v.2.01 AND The Professional Peer Review Package (DEA PRP) + Contact the publisher via mail, E-Mail, or, + FTP to Michigan State University: ripem.msu.edu FTP Directory: /pub/crypt/other Filenames: nellis-dea2tech-msdos.zip nellis-dea201-msdos.zip Note: Users must obtain registered login passwords to access crypto materials at this site. To obtain login and password, E-mail Mark Riordan at ripem.msu.edu. State your name, nationality and the name and location of your internet host. You will receive your login and password via return E-mail. + In Toronto, Canada (DEA201.ZIP ONLY): BBS NAME Tel. Number Area Code ------------------------- ------------- ---------- Ability Online ++ 650-5411 -416- Baudville BBS 283-0114 -416- The Westonia BBS 241-9793 -416- ++ = both DEA201 & DEA2TECH archives are available at site Keyword search: DEA201, encryption, security, Nellis, du Maurier File designation: DEA201.ZIP (~179,000 bytes) USER PKG. DEA2TECH.ZIP (~130,000 bytes) PRP PKG. The Commercial Version of the Program ------------------------------------- The DEA ACV 2.00 will become available in May 1994. Its key structure is equivalent to that of the Standard Version, 2.01. However, the ACV employs two (2) key files, one key is 180 bytes (1,440) bits in length, the other is 400 bytes (3,200) bits for a total effective keyspace of not less than: 2^4,608,000 or 256^72,000 Please inquire if you desire more detailed information on the Advanced Commercial Version, (ACV). THE PROFESSIONAL PEER REVIEW PACKAGE ------------------------------------ The DEA PRP is targeted to professional cryptographers who desire to fully examine the DEA's operation and transformations. It provides almost all required information. It is suggested the interested individuals obtain both archives, DEA201.ZIP AND DEA2TECH.ZIP so that they have the most complete information. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: ---------------------------- THE DATA ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM (DEA v.2.00) IS NOT AND HAS NEVER BEEN AFFILIATED WITH ANY OTHER CRYPTOGRAPHIC DESIGN, PRODUCT, OR MANUFACTURER. ANY NAME SIMILARITY IS PURELY COINCIDENTAL AND UNINTENSIONAL. IF ANY CONFUSION ARISES, THE DEA IS TO BE REFERRED TO AS: "THE DEA FROM NELLIS DU MAURIER". EVERY NEW CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCHEME CAN BE NAMED THE DATA ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM (DEA). Such a designation is not proper subject matter for copyright or trademark laws, and thus, the reference to 'DEA' does not infringe on any official names of any algorithms designed to encrypt data. Indeed, there can be no concrete algorithm with just the name Data Encryption Algorithm, (DEA), officially, or otherwise. Therefore, during this review period, this algorithm should simply be referred to as the "DEA from ND". Following favourable peer review of the DEA, the algorithm will be renamed to: NDISA. Brief Technical Synopsis: KEY: Eighteen bytes per File Block, ten (10) File Blocks total Total Session Key Length: 180 bytes, 1,440 bits 'C' language key template shown below: static struct file_block_key { /* THE DEA KEY STRUCTURE PER FILE BLOCK */ unsigned long int file_block, ...... Variable prime_divisor, * 4 bytes Constant numerator, * 4 bytes Constant IF_divisor, * 4 bytes Variable CS chaining IF_numerator; * 4 bytes Variable CS chaining unsigned char SABV, * 1 byte Constant select_digit, * 1 byte Constant start_vector; - reserved for DEA ACV 2.00, presently defined as ZERO }; THE CIPHER FUNCTION: The DEA C.F. requires four (4) data inputs as listed below; the permutation 'P' provides the entropy for the DEA. The key data only controls the C.F. 1. 8-bit plaintext byte * 2. 8-bit Select Digit (one of the digits 0-9) * 3. 8-bit Stop Address Byte Value (one of the values 0-255) 4. permutation (P): P = 10^otp_size (THE ONE-TIME-PAD) * = C.F. control variables Shown below is the definition of the DEA 2.00 Cipher Function: ....................................................... . DEA v.2.00 Cipher Function Definition . . ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ . . . . Given a plaintext 8 bit value, perform an . . unknown number of XOR operations upon this . . value by using the Select Digit Frame Summation . . values derived from the one-time-pad, and . . [attempt], via random XORing, to convert the . . plaintext byte into the Stop Address Byte Value. . . . . When this directed conversion has been . . successful, record the current position of the . . last Select Digit read by the Cipher Function . . represented as a linear address from the . . beginning of the current one-time-pad and write . . this value in 16-bit format as ciphertext. . . We say the Data Input set has been satisfied. . ....................................................... THE CIPHERTEXT: Represented in 16-bit format, and ranging from a minimum of 1,301 to a maximum of 20,000. The term STOP ADDRESS is given to this data entity and indicates a location marker in a specific 10^otp_size permutation of (P). THE DEA IN A NUTSHELL: The DEA creates a one-time-pad for every plaintext entity, where the Stop Address (ciphertext) has meaning only if: A. it is mapped correctly to a particular one-time-pad B. the Cipher Function is configured properly (see above, C.F. data inputs) C. the complete ciphertext CS chaining is intact Entropy is provided by the one-time-pad permutation of otp_size digits -- 10^otp_size which is known as 'P'. DEA Technical Type Characteristics: conventional .................... YES public .......................... NO stream .......................... YES block ........................... NO symmetrical ..................... YES asymmetrical .................... NO closed .......................... YES (limited number of keys) open ............................ NO (unlimited number of keys) key length ...................... 180 BYTES, (1,440 BITS) total key space.................. 256^180, or 2^1,440 (+) keyspace extendable ............. YES employs PRNG's .................. NO one (1) Key 'Round' equals ...... Ten (10) bytes ciphertext type ................. 16-bit Stop Address (typically), and / or 8-bit scrambled word cipher function ................. DIRECTED CONVERSION VIA RANDOM MULTIPLE XORing TO THE SABV one-time-pad size ............... 1,300 digits to 20,000 digits one-time-pad creator ............ long division of fraction N/D (entropy) with random mod-mult feed -> (P) logical joining function ........ XOR (exclusive OR) chaining: Key & plaintext controlled Cascade Synchronized one-time-pad mapping & chaining security claims made ............ 1. more secure than the DES 2. more secure than hybrid RSA 3. ciphertext unsuitable for traditional cryptanalytic methodology 4. broken by brute-force only 5. not unbreakable 6. ciphertext cannot be attacked anywhere method of attack ................ brute force of FIRST(!) 200 Stop Addresses (400 bytes) for confirmation of key via linguistic checking ciphertext corruption ........... typically unrecoverable in future rounds FEATURES: 1. extremely large keyspace and long keys 2. no short-cut methods are presently known to exist, except brute-force 3. actual key not combined with plaintext; provides control only 4. severs all relationships between plaintext and ciphertext, and key 5. is extendable and modifiable in several ways to meet future computational threats 6. a near one-time-pad implementation 7. simple design with high cryptographic strength 8. defeats electronic signal monitoring schemes COPYRIGHT NOTICE ---------------- This public message announcement contains information which has previously been copyrighted by the publisher: Nellis du Maurier Information Security 33 Isabella St., Ste. 1005 Toronto, ON M4Y 2P7 Canada Copyright (c) 1993, 1994 by Nellis du Maurier Information Security DISTRIBUTION NOTICE ------------------- Permission to distribute this document is granted.