



# PKCS #10 v1.7: Certification Request Syntax Standard (Draft)

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Editor’s note: This is the 1<sup>st</sup> draft of PKCS #10 v1.7, which is available for a 30-day public review period. Please send comments and suggestions, both technical and editorial, to [pkcs-editor@rsasecurity.com](mailto:pkcs-editor@rsasecurity.com) or [pkcs-tng@rsasecurity.com](mailto:pkcs-tng@rsasecurity.com).

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## 1. Introduction

This document describes syntax for certification requests. A certification request consists of a distinguished name, a public key, and optionally a set of attributes, collectively signed by the entity requesting certification. Certification requests are sent to a certification authority, which transforms the request into an X.509 [8] public-key certificate. (In what form the certification authority returns the newly signed certificate is outside the scope of this document. A PKCS #7 [1] message is one possibility.)

The intention of including a set of attributes is twofold: to provide other information about a given entity<sup>1</sup>, or a “challenge password” by which the entity may later request certificate revocation; and to provide attributes for inclusion in X.509 certificates. A non-exhaustive list of attributes is given in PKCS #9 [2].

Certification authorities may also require non-electronic forms of request and may return non-electronic replies. It is expected that descriptions of such forms, which are outside the scope of this document, will be available from certification authorities.

The preliminary intended application of this document is to support PKCS #7 cryptographic messages, but it is expected that other applications will be developed (see e.g. [3]).

## 2. Definitions and notation

### 2.1 Definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following definitions apply.

**ALGORITHM:** An information object class defined in X.509 to describe objects composed of an algorithm (a unique object identifier) and its parameters (any ASN.1 type). The values of objects in this class can be represented by the ASN.1 type **AlgorithmIdentifier**{}. **ALGORITHM** is defined as the “useful” information object class **TYPE-IDENTIFIER**, specified in [10], Annex A.

**AlgorithmIdentifier**{}: A useful parameterized version of X.509 type **AlgorithmIdentifier** is defined in this document. This type tightly binds pairs of **algorithm** object identifiers to their associated **parameter** types. When referenced, the single parameter of **AlgorithmIdentifier**{} specifies a constraint on the pairs of values that may appear in that instance of the type. The encoded values of **AlgorithmIdentifier**{} are equivalent to those of type **AlgorithmIdentifier**.

**ASN.1:** Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in the ASN.1 standards ([9], [10], [11], [12]).

**ATTRIBUTE:** This class describes objects composed of an attribute (a unique object identifier) and an associated set of attribute values (any ASN.1 type). The values of objects in this class can be represented by type **Attribute**{}.

**Attribute**{}: A useful parameterized version of X.501 [7] type **Attribute** is defined in this document. This type tightly binds pairs of attribute **type** object identifiers to one or more attribute **values** types. In the ASN.1 open type notation, an attribute type is defined as **ATTRIBUTE.&id** and an attribute value as **ATTRIBUTE.&Type**. When referenced, the single parameter of **Attribute**{} specifies a constraint on the pairs of values that may appear in an instance of the type. The encoded values of **Attribute**{} are equivalent to those of type **Attribute**.

---

<sup>1</sup> E.g. the postal address to which the signed certificate should be returned if electronic mail is not available.

**BER:** Basic Encoding Rules for ASN.1, as defined in X.690 ([13]).

**Certificate:** A type that binds a subject entity's distinguished name to a public key with a digital signature. This type is defined in X.509. This type also contains the distinguished name of the certificate issuer (the signer), an issuer-specific serial number, the issuer's signature algorithm identifier, a validity period, and an optional set of certificate extensions.

**DER:** Distinguished Encoding Rules for ASN.1, as defined in X.690. DER is a subset of BER.

**Name:** A type that uniquely identifies or "distinguishes" objects in an X.500 [6] directory. This type is defined in X.501. In an X.509 certificate, the type identifies the certificate issuer and the certificate subject, the entity whose public key is certified.

## 2.2 Notation

In this document, all ASN.1 types and values are written in **bold Helvetica**.

## 3. Overview

A certification request consists of three parts: "certification request information," a signature algorithm identifier, and a digital signature on the certification request information. The certification request information consists of the entity's distinguished name, the entity's public key, and a set of attributes providing other information about the entity.

The process by which a certification request is constructed involves the following steps:

1. A **CertificationRequestInfo** value containing a subject distinguished name, a subject public key, and optionally a set of attributes is constructed by an entity requesting certification.
2. The **CertificationRequestInfo** value is signed with the subject entity's private key. (See Section 4.2.)
3. The **CertificationRequestInfo** value, a signature algorithm identifier, and the entity's signature are collected together into a **CertificationRequest** value, defined below.

A certification authority fulfills the request by authenticating the requesting entity and verifying the entity's signature, and, if the request is valid, constructing an X.509 certificate from the distinguished name and public key, the issuer name, and the certification authority's choice of serial number, validity period, and signature algorithm. If the certification request contains any PKCS #9 attributes, the certification authority may also use the values in these attributes as well as other information known to the certification authority to construct X.509 certificate extensions.

In what form the certification authority returns the new certificate is outside the scope of this document. One possibility is a PKCS #7 cryptographic message with content type

**signedData**, following the degenerate case where there are no signers. The return message may include a certification path from the new certificate to the certification authority. It may also include other certificates such as cross-certificates that the certification authority considers helpful, and it may include certificate-revocation lists (CRLs). Another possibility is that the certification authority inserts the new certificate into a central database.

Note 1 – An entity would typically send a certification request after generating a public-key/private-key pair, but may also do so after a change in the entity's distinguished name.

Note 2 – The signature on the certification request prevents an entity from requesting a certificate with another party's public key. Such an attack would give the entity the minor ability to pretend to be the originator of any message signed by the other party. This attack is significant only if the entity does not know the message being signed and the signed part of the message does not identify the signer. The entity would still not be able to decrypt messages intended for the other party, of course.

Note 3 – How the entity sends the certification request to a certification authority is outside the scope of this document. Both paper and electronic forms are possible.

Note 4 – This document is not compatible with the certification request syntax for Privacy-Enhanced Mail, as described in RFC 1424 [3]. The syntax here differs in three respects: It allows a set of attributes; it does not include issuer name, serial number, or validity period; and it does not require an “innocuous” message to be signed. This document is designed to minimize request size, an important feature for certification authorities accepting requests on paper.

## 4. Certification request syntax

This section is divided into two parts. The first part describes the certification-request-information type **CertificationRequestInfo**, and the second part describes the top-level type **CertificationRequest**.

### 4.1 CertificationRequestInfo

Certification request information shall have ASN.1 type **CertificationRequestInfo**:

```
CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    version          INTEGER { v1(0) } (v1,...),
    subject          Name,
    subjectPKInfo    SubjectPublicKeyInfo{{ PKInfoAlgorithms }},
    attributes       [0] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }}
}
```

```
SubjectPublicKeyInfo { ALGORITHM : IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier {{IOSet}},
    subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
}
```

```
PKInfoAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
```

```

... -- add any locally defined algorithms here -- }
Attributes { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SET OF Attribute({ IOSet })

CRIAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {
... -- add any locally defined attributes here -- }

Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
type    ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}),
values  SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}){@type}
}

```

The components of type **CertificationRequestInfo** have the following meanings:

**version** is the version number, for compatibility with future revisions of this document. It shall be **0** for this version of the standard.

**subject** is the distinguished name of the certificate subject (the entity whose public key is to be certified).

**subjectPublicKeyInfo** contains information about the public key being certified. The information identifies the entity's public-key algorithm (and any associated parameters); examples of public-key algorithms include the **rsaEncryption** object identifier from PKCS #1 [1]. The information also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public key. For the public-key algorithm just mentioned, the bit string contains the DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type **RSAPublicKey**. The values of type **SubjectPublicKeyInfo** allowed for **subjectPKInfo** are constrained to the values specified by the information object set **PKIAlgorithms**, which includes the extension marker (...). Definitions of specific algorithm objects are left to specifications that reference this document. Such specifications will be interoperable with their future versions if any additional algorithm objects are added after the extension marker.

**attributes** is a collection of attributes providing additional information about the subject of the certificate. Some attribute types that might be useful here are defined in PKCS #9. An example is the challenge-password attribute, which specifies a password by which the entity may request certificate revocation. Another example is information to appear in X.509 certificate extensions (e.g. the **extensionRequest** attribute from PKCS #9). The values of type **Attributes** allowed for **attributes** are constrained to the values specified by the information object set **CRIAttributes**. Definitions of specific attribute objects are left to specifications that reference this document. Such specifications will be interoperable with their future versions if any additional attribute objects are added after the extension marker.

## 4.2 CertificationRequest

A certification request shall have ASN.1 type **CertificationRequest**:

```

CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    certificationRequestInfo CertificationRequestInfo,
    signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{{ SignatureAlgorithms }},
    signature BIT STRING
}

```

```

AlgorithmIdentifier {ALGORITHM:IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({IOSet}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({IOSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
}

```

```

SignatureAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
    ... -- add any locally defined algorithms here --
}

```

The components of type **CertificationRequest** have the following meanings:

- **certificationRequestInfo** is the “certification request information.” It is the value being signed.
- **signatureAlgorithm** identifies the signature algorithm (and any associated parameters) under which the certification-request information is signed. For example, a specification might include an **ALGORITHM** object for PKCS #1's **md5WithRSAEncryption** in the information object set **SignatureAlgorithms**:

```

SignatureAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
    ...,
    { NULL IDENTIFIED BY md5WithRSAEncryption }
}

```

- **signature** is the result of signing the certification request information with the certification request subject's private key.

The signature process consists of two steps:

1. The value of the **certificationRequestInfo** component is DER encoded, yielding an octet string.
2. The result of step 1 is signed with the certification request subject's private key under the specified signature algorithm, yielding a bit string, the signature.

Note – An equivalent syntax for **CertificationRequest** could be written:

```

CertificationRequest ::= SIGNED { EncodedCertificationRequestInfo }
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- Verify or sign encoded CertificationRequestInfo -- })

```

```

EncodedCertificationRequestInfo ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type(CertificationRequestInfo)

```

```

SIGNED { ToBeSigned } ::= SEQUENCE {
    toBeSigned ToBeSigned,
    algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier { {SignatureAlgorithms} },
    signature BIT STRING
}

```

## A. ASN.1 Module

This appendix includes all of the ASN.1 type and value definitions contained in this document in the form of the ASN.1 module **PKCS-10**.

```
PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)}
```

```
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
```

```
BEGIN
```

```
-- EXPORTS All --
```

```
-- All types and values defined in this module are exported for use in other ASN.1 modules.
```

```
IMPORTS
```

```
informationFramework, authenticationFramework
  FROM UsefulDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)
    usefulDefinitions(0) 3}
```

```
ATTRIBUTE, Name
  FROM InformationFramework informationFramework
```

```
ALGORITHM
  FROM AuthenticationFramework authenticationFramework;
```

```
-- Certificate requests
```

```
CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  version    INTEGER { v1(0) } (v1,...),
  subject    Name,
  subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo{{ PKInfoAlgorithms }},
  attributes [0] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }}
}
```

```
SubjectPublicKeyInfo {ALGORITHM: IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
  algorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier {{IOSet}},
  subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
}
```

```
PKInfoAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { ... -- add any locally defined algorithms here -- }
```

```
Attributes { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SET OF Attribute{{ IOSet }}
```

```
CRIAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... -- add any locally defined attributes here -- }
```

```
Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
  type    ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}),
  values  SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type})
}
```

```
CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
  certificationRequestInfo CertificationRequestInfo,
  signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier{{ SignatureAlgorithms }},
  signature                BIT STRING
}
```

```
AlgorithmIdentifier {ALGORITHM:IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
  algorithm  ALGORITHM.&id({IOSet}),
  parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({IOSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
}
```

SignatureAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { ... -- add any locally defined algorithms here -- }

END

## B. Intellectual property considerations

RSA Security makes no patent claims on the general constructions described in this document, although specific underlying techniques may be covered.

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RSA Security makes no representations regarding intellectual property claims by other parties. Such determination is the responsibility of the user.

## C. Revision history

### Version 1.0

Version 1.0 was the previous version of this document (also published as “version 1.5” in [5]).

### Version 1.7

This (draft) version incorporates several editorial changes, including updates to the references, and significant changes to ASN.1 type definitions. The following substantive changes have been made:

- This version refers to X.680-X.690, the current international standards for ASN.1 and its encoding rules. All references to X.208 and X.209 have been eliminated.
- The X.690 standard requires that the encoded values of **SET OF** components be sorted in ascending order under DER. Regardless of this, applications should not rely on the ordering of attribute components.
- All references to PKCS #6 Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard have been removed. With the addition of extensions to X.509 version 3 certificates, RSA Laboratories is withdrawing support for PKCS #6.

Note – The reason for using version 1.7 for this document is to avoid confusion with [5], which is named version 1.5, and an unsupported PKCS #10 version named Version 1.6.

## D. References

- [1] RSA Laboratories. *PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard*. Version 2.0, October 1998.
- [2] RSA Laboratories. *PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard*. Version 1.5, November 1993.
- [3] RSA Laboratories. *PKCS #9: Selected Attribute Types*. Version 2.0, February 2000.



- [4] C. Adams, S. Farrell. *RFC 2510: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure – Certificate Management Protocols*. March 1999.
- [5] B. Kaliski. *RFC 1424: Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services*. February 1993.
- [6] B. Kaliski. *RFC 2314: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Version 1.5*. March 1998.
- [7] ITU-T Recommendation X.500 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-1:1997, *Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Overview of concepts, models and services*.
- [8] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:1995, *Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models*.
- [9] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:1997, *Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -The Directory: Authentication framework*.
- [10] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:1998, *Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of Basic Notation*.
- [11] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-2:1998, *Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information Object Specification*.
- [12] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-3:1998, *Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint Specification*.
- [13] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-4:1998, *Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications*.
- [14] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:1998, *Information Technology - ASN.1 Encoding Rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)*.

## **E. About PKCS**

The *Public-Key Cryptography Standards* are specifications produced by RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a result of meetings with a small group of early adopters of public-key technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented. Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of many formal and *de facto* standards, including ANSI X9 documents, PKIX, SET, S/MIME, and SSL.

Further development of PKCS occurs through mailing list discussions and occasional workshops, and suggestions for improvement are welcome. For more information, contact:

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