Authors, OPS-DIR, I have reviewed "Access Network Identifier Option in DHCP" as part of the Operational directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written with the intent of improving the operational aspects of the IETF drafts. Comments that are not addressed in last call may be included in AD reviews during the IESG review. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. State: >Mostly Ready, please consider the comment below< Despite having some exposure to both, iana PMIPv6 or DHCP expert and so this is a high-level review. This draft specifies the optional capability in DHCP to identify access network ID and operator ID for the possible application of policy on operator-specific handling, traffic management, or differentiated services. Often these are carefully planned and controlled networking capabilities, so some form of ID integrity protection would be welcome. Thus, it's worrisome when the authors remind us in the Security Considerations section (9): ...DHCP itself is inherently unsecure and thus link-layer confidentiality and integrity protection should be employed to reduce the risk of disclosure and tampering. maybe s/should/SHOULD/ ? or stronger? Other solutions or explanation welcome. regards, Al