And of course that crossed in the mail with the new draft ;-) So now my review is "Ready", thanks. I am short of time so I will omit the Gen-ART boilerplate. Regards Brian On 16/03/2016 17:22, Brian E Carpenter wrote: > I am on travel and have not yet seen a -08 version appear, but it's > getting quite close to the IESG telechat. > > Formally my review is still "Almost ready". However, if the changes > suggested by the authors are in the -08 version, that will become "Ready." > > Regards > Brian Carpenter > > On 08/03/2016 14:48, Brian E Carpenter wrote: >> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area >> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed >> by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just >> like any other last call comments. >> >> For more information, please see the FAQ at >> < http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>. >> >> Document: draft-ietf-dprive-dns-over-tls-07.txt >> Reviewer: Brian Carpenter >> Review Date: 2016-03-08 >> IETF LC End Date: 2016-03-15 >> IESG Telechat date: 2016-03-17 >> >> Summary: Almost ready >> -------- >> >> Minor Issues: >> ------------- >> >> "3.1. Session Initiation >> >> A DNS server that supports DNS-over-TLS MUST listen for and accept >> TCP connections on port 853. By mutual agreement with its clients, >> the server MAY, instead, use a port other than 853 for DNS-over-TLS. >> >> DNS clients desiring privacy from DNS-over-TLS from a particular >> server MUST establish a TCP connection to port 853 on the server. By >> mutual agreement with its server, the client MAY, instead, use a port >> other than port 853 for DNS-over-TLS." >> >> Well, that makes my head hurt. I think the only way to relieve the pain >> is if both of those MUSTs are replaced by "MUST by default". However, >> that means that both clients and servers need a configuration option >> to use a different port, and I think that needs to be stated too. >> >> "4.1. Opportunistic Privacy Profile >> ... >> With opportunistic privacy, a client might learn of a TLS-enabled >> recursive DNS resolver from an untrusted source (such as DHCP while >> roaming), it might or might not validate the resolver." >> >> This seems rather underspecified to me. How would a TLS-enabled >> resolver be identified in DHCP? How would it be described in >> an IPv6 RA (RFC6106)? >> >> I would have thought that the natural thing would have been to >> simply try TLS on port 853, and be happy if it worked. >> >> "9. Security Considerations" >> >> I hoped to find a comment on interaction between DNS/TLS and DNSSEC, >> even if the comment is only that there is no issue. >>