I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments should be treated like other last call comments. This draft provides a null authentication method and a null identity for use in IPsec, specifically the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2). Overall this is an excellent draft and useful in countering pervasive surveillance in IKEv2. The Security Considerations section is quite thorough. I did notice one small thing: Section 3.1 is labeled "Audit trail and peer identification". But the content of that Security Considerations section is about not trusting identification when null authentication is used. It seems to me that a few words to the effect that some clear indication should be present in audit/log trails when a purported identity has not been authentication should  be included, as I expected them to be from the section heading. Thanks, Donald =============================  Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)  155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA   d3e3e3 at gmail.com