Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM, RFC 6376) defines a mechanism for using a digital signature to associate a domain identity with an email message in a secure way, and to assure receiving domains that the message has not been altered since the signature was created. Receiving systems can use this information as part of their message-handling decision. This can help reduce spam, phishing, and other unwanted or malicious email. A DKIM-signed message can be re-posted, to additional recipients, in a fashion that retains the original signature. With an author and a recipient collaborating, this can "replay" the message, using the original signer's reputation to propagate email with problematic content -- spam, phishing, and the like. Generally, the technical characteristics of this form of abuse match that of legitimate mail, making its detection or prevention challenging. Timestamps and carefully-tailored message signing conventions are appealing approaches to replay mitigation. Each has significant limitations. The DKIM working group will produce one or more technical specifications that describe the abuse and propose replay-resistant mechanisms. The working group will seek compatibility with DKIM's broad deployment. Current proposals include the following drafts:  - draft-bradshaw-envelope-validation-extension-dkim  - draft-chuang-replay-resistant-arc  - draft-gondwana-email-mailpath  - draft-kucherawy-dkim-anti-replay The working group may adopt or ignore these as it sees fit.