COSE K. Isobe Internet-Draft SECOM CO., LTD. Intended status: Standards Track H. Tschofenig Expires: 25 April 2024 O. Steele Transmute 23 October 2023 CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key Thumbprint draft-ietf-cose-key-thumbprint-04 Abstract This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a COSE Key. It defines which fields in a COSE Key structure are used in the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form of the fields, and how to hash the byte sequence. The resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting a key that is the subject of the thumbprint. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 April 2024. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 1] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. COSE Key Thumbprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Required COSE Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.1. Octet Key Pair (OKP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.2. Elliptic Curve Keys with X- and Y-Coordinate Pair . . . . 4 4.3. RSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.4. Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.5. HSS-LMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.6. Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Miscellaneous Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Why Not Include Optional COSE Key Parameters? . . . . . . 5 5.2. Selection of Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.3. Thumbprints of Keys Not in COSE Key Format . . . . . . . 6 5.4. Relationship to Digests of X.509 Values . . . . . . . . . 6 5.5. Confirmation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.6. COSE Key Thumbprint URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. Introduction This specification defines a method for computing a hash value (a.k.a. digest) over a COSE Key structure [RFC9052]. It defines which fields in a COSE Key structure are used in the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form for those fields, and how to hash the byte sequence. The resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting the key that is the subject of the thumbprint, for instance, by using the COSE Key Thumbprint value as a "kid" (key ID) value. This specification defines how thumbprints of COSE keys are created. Additionally, a new CWT confirmation method is added to the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" registry created by [RFC8747]. See Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] for details about the use of a confirmation claim in a CWT with a proof-of-possession key. Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 2] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. COSE Key Thumbprint The thumbprint of a COSE Key MUST be computed as follows: 1. Construct a COSE_Key structure (see Section 7 of [RFC9052]) containing only the required parameters representing the key. This specification describes what those required parameters are and what, if necessary, what the unique encoding is. 2. Apply the deterministic encoding described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC8949] to the representation constructed in step (1). 3. Hash the bytes produced in step (2) with a cryptographic hash function H. For example, SHA-256 [RFC6234] may be used as a hash function. The resulting value is the COSE Key Thumbprint with H of the COSE Key. The details of this computation are further described in subsequent sections. 4. Required COSE Key Parameters Only the required parameters of a key's representation are used when computing its COSE Key Thumbprint value. This section summarizes the required parameters. The "kty" (label: 1) element MUST be present for all key types and the integer value found in the IANA COSE Key Types registry MUST be used. The tstr data type is not used with the kty element. Many COSE Key parameters depend on the chosen key type. The subsection below list the required parameters for commonly used key types. 4.1. Octet Key Pair (OKP) The required parameters for elliptic curve public keys that use the OKP key type, such as X25519, are: * "kty" (label: 1, data type: int, value: 1) Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 3] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 * "crv" (label: -1, value: int) * "x" (label: -2, value: bstr) Details can be found in Section 7.1 of [RFC9053]. 4.2. Elliptic Curve Keys with X- and Y-Coordinate Pair The required parameters for elliptic curve public keys that use the EC2 key type, such as NIST P-256, are: * "kty" (label: 1, data type: int, value: 2) * "crv" (label: -1, data type: int) * "x" (label: -2, data type: bstr) * "y" (label: -3, data type: bstr) Details can be found in Section 7.1 of [RFC9053]. Note: [RFC9052] offers both compressed as well as uncompressed point representations. For interoperability, implementations following this specification MUST use the uncompressed point representation. Hence, the y-coordinate is expressed as a bstr. An implementation that uses the compressed point representation MUST compute the uncompressed representation for the purpose of the thumbprint calculation. 4.3. RSA Public Keys The required parameters for an RSA public key are: * "kty" (label: 1, data type: int, value: 3) * "n" (label: -1, data type: bstr) * "e" (label: -2, data type: bstr) 4.4. Symmetric Keys The required parameters for a symmetric key are: * "kty" (label: 1, data type: int, value: 4) * "k" (label: -1, data type: bstr) Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 4] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 4.5. HSS-LMS The required parameters for HSS-LMS keys are: * "kty" (label: 1, data type: int, value: 5) * "pub" (label: -1, data type: bstr) 4.6. Others As other key type values are defined, the specifications defining them should be similarly consulted to determine which parameters, in addition to the "kty" element, are required. 5. Miscellaneous Considerations 5.1. Why Not Include Optional COSE Key Parameters? Optional parameters of COSE Keys are intentionally not included in the COSE Key Thumbprint computation so that their absence or presence in the COSE Key does not alter the resulting value. The COSE Key Thumbprint value is a digest of the parameters required to represent the key as a COSE Key -- not of additional data that may also accompany the key. Optional parameters are not included so that the COSE Key Thumbprint refers to a key -- not a key with an associated set of key attributes. Different application contexts might or might not include different subsets of optional attributes about the key in the COSE Key structure. If these were included in the calculation of the COSE Key Thumbprint, the values would be different for those COSE Keys, even though the keys are the same. The benefit of including only the required parameters is that the COSE Key Thumbprint of any COSE Key representing the key remains the same, regardless of any other attributes that are present. Different kinds of thumbprints could be defined by other specifications that might include some or all additional COSE Key parameters, if use cases arise where such different kinds of thumbprints would be useful. Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 5] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 5.2. Selection of Hash Function A specific hash function must be chosen by an application to compute the hash value of the hash input. For example, SHA-256 [RFC6234] might be used as the hash function by the application. While SHA-256 is a good default choice at the time of writing, the hash function of choice can be expected to change over time as the cryptographic landscape evolves. Note that in many cases, only the party that creates a key will need to know the hash function used. A typical usage is for the producer of the key to use the thumbprint value as a "kid" (key ID) value. In this case, the consumer of the "kid" treats it as an opaque value that it uses to select the key. However, in some cases, multiple parties will be reproducing the COSE Key Thumbprint calculation and comparing the results. In these cases, the parties will need to know which hash function was used and use the same one. 5.3. Thumbprints of Keys Not in COSE Key Format A key need not be in COSE Key format to create a COSE Key Thumbprint of it. The only prerequisites are that the COSE Key representation of the key be defined and the party creating the COSE KEY Thumbprint be in possession of the necessary key material. 5.4. Relationship to Digests of X.509 Values COSE Key Thumbprint values are computed on the COSE Key element required to represent a key, rather than all members of a COSE Key that the key is represented in. Thus, they are more analogous to applications that use digests of X.509 Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) values, which are defined in Section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280], than to applications that use digests of complete certificate values, as the "x5t" (X.509 certificate SHA-1 thumbprint) [RFC9360] value defined for X.509 certificate objects does. While logically equivalent to a digest of the SPKI representation of the key, a COSE Key Thumbprint is computed over the CBOR representation of that key, rather than over an ASN.1 representation of it. 5.5. Confirmation Methods [RFC8747] introduced confirmation methods for use with CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs). CWTs have been defined in [RFC8392]. This specification adds a new confirmation method based on COSE Key Thumbprints. Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 6] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 The proof-of-possession key is identified using the "ckt" claim, the COSE Key Thumbprint claim. This claim contains the value of the COSE Key Thumbprint encoded as a binary string. Instead of communicating the actual COSE Key only the thumbprint is conveyed. This approach assumes that the recipient is able to obtain the identified COSE Key using the thumbprint contained in the "ckt" claim. In this case, the issuer of a CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm the presenter's proof of possession of the key by including a "ckt" claim in the CWT. The following example demonstrates the use of the "ckt" claim in a CWT (with line-breaks inserted for editorial reasons): { /iss/ 1 : "coaps://as.example.com", /aud/ 3 : "coaps://resource.example.org", /exp/ 4 : 1361398824, /cnf/ 8 : { /ckt/ [[TBD1]] : h'496bd8afadf307e5b08c64b0421bf9dc 01528a344a43bda88fadd1669da253ec' } } Section 8 registers the "ckt" claim and the confirmation method. The "ckt" claim is expected to be used in the "cnf" claim. 5.6. COSE Key Thumbprint URIs This specification defines Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to represent a COSE Key Thumbprint value. The design follows the work of the JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint URIs, specified in [RFC9278]. This enables COSE Key Thumbprints to be used, for example, as key identifiers in contexts requiring URIs. This specification defines a URI prefix indicating that the portion of the URI following the prefix is a COSE Key Thumbprint. The following URI prefix is defined to indicate that the portion of the URI following the prefix is a COSE Key Thumbprint: urn:ietf:params:oauth:ckt To make the hash algorithm being used explicit in a URI, the prefix is followed by a hash algorithm identifier and a COSE Key Thumbprint value, each separated by a colon character to form a URI representing a COSE Key Thumbprint. Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 7] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 Hash algorithm identifiers used in COSE Key Thumbprint URIs MUST be values from the "Hash Name String" column in the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" [IANA.Hash.Algorithms]. COSE Key Thumbprint URIs with hash algorithm identifiers not found in this registry are not considered valid and applications will need to detect and handle this error, should it occur. To promote interoperability among implementations, the SHA-256 hash algorithm is mandatory to implement. Since the URN is encoded as a string, the output of the COSE Key Thumbprint computation described in Section 3 MUST be base64url encoded without padding. [RFC7515] specifies Base64url encoding as follows: "Base64 encoding using the URL- and filename-safe character set defined in Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648], with all trailing '=' characters omitted and without the inclusion of any line breaks, whitespace, or other additional characters. Note that the base64url encoding of the empty octet sequence is the empty string. (See Appendix C of [RFC7515] for notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding.)" The base64url encoding of the thumbprint shown in Section 6 is shown below (with a line-break added for readability purposes). SWvYr63zB-WwjGSwQhv53AFSijRKQ72oj63RZp2iU-w The full example of a COSE Key Thumbprint URI is shown below, again with a line-break added. urn:ietf:params:oauth:ckt:sha-256: SWvYr63zB-WwjGSwQhv53AFSijRKQ72oj63RZp2iU-w 6. Example This section demonstrates the COSE Key Thumbprint computation for the following example COSE Key containing an ECC public key. For better readability, the example is first presented in CBOR diagnostic format (with the long line broken for display purposes only). Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 8] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 { / kty set to EC2 = Elliptic Curve Keys / 1:2, / crv set to P-256 / -1:1, / public key: x-coordinate / -2:h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de439c0 8551d', / public key: y-coordinate / -3:h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3dc9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd008 4d19c', / kid is bstr, not used in COSE Key Thumbprint / 2:h'1decade2facade3' } The example above corresponds to the following CBOR encoding (with link breaks added for display purposes only): A50102200121582065EDA5A12577C2BAE829437FE338701A10AAA375E1BB5B5DE108D E439C08551D2258201E52ED75701163F7F9E40DDF9F341B3DC9BA860AF7E0CA7CA7E9 EECD0084D19C0258246D65726961646F632E6272616E64796275636B406275636B6C6 16E642E6578616D706C65 Not all of the parameters from the example above are used in the COSE Key Thumbprint computation since the required parameters of an elliptic curve public key are (as listed in Section 4.2) "kty", "crv", "x", and "y". The resulting COSE Key structure, in CBOR diagnostic format with line-breaks added for better readability, with the minimum parameters in the correct order are. { 1:2, -1:1, -2:h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a 10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de439c08551d', -3:h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3d c9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd0084d19c' } In CBOR encoding the result is (with line-breaks added for display purposes only): A40102200121582065EDA5A12577C2BAE829437FE338701A10AAA375E1BB5B5DE 108DE439C08551D2258201E52ED75701163F7F9E40DDF9F341B3DC9BA860AF7E0 CA7CA7E9EECD0084D19C Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 9] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 Using SHA-256, the resulting thumbprint is: 496bd8afadf307e5b08c64b0421bf9dc01528a344a43bda88fadd1669da253ec 7. Security Considerations A COSE Key Thumbprint will only uniquely identify a particular key if a single unambiguous COSE Key representation for that key is defined and used when computing the COSE Key Thumbprint. If two asymmetric keys are used by different parties with different key identifiers then the COSE Key Thumbprints will still be equal since the key identifier itself is not included in the thumbprint calculation (similarly to other optional parameters in the COSE_Key structure). When the inclusion of certain optional parameters in the thumbprint calcuation is important for a given application, this specification is not the appropriate choice. To promote interoperability among implementations, the SHA-256 hash algorithm is mandatory to implement. While thumbprint values are valuable for identifying legitimate keys, comparing thumbprint values is not a reliable means of excluding the use of particular keys (or transformations thereof). The reason is that an attacker may supply a key that is a transformation of a key in order to have it appear to be a different key. For instance, if a legitimate RSA key uses a modulus value N and an attacker supplies a key with modulus 3*N, the modified key would still work about 1/3 of the time, but would appear to be a different key. Producing thumbprints of symmetric keys needs to be done with care. Developers MUST ensure that the symmetric key has sufficient entropy to prevent attackers to precompute tables of symmetric keys with their corresponding hash values. This can be prevented if the symmetric key is a randomly selected key of at least 128 bit length. Using thumbprints with passwords (i.e. low-entropy secrets) is dangerous and MUST be avoided. If a developer is unable to determine whether all symmetric keys used in an application have sufficient entropy, then thumbprints of symmetric keys MUST NOT be used. In general, using thumbprints of symmetric keys should only be used in special applications. In most other deployment scenarios it is more appropriate to utilize a different naming scheme for key identifiers. 8. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to add the following entry to the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" registry established by [RFC8747]: Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 10] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 * Confirmation Method Name: ckt * Confirmation Method Description: COSE Key Thumbprint * JWT Confirmation Method Name: jkt * Confirmation Key: [[TBD1]] * Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string * Change Controller: IESG * Specification Document(s): [[This document]] Furthermore, IANA is requested to add a value to the IANA "OAuth URI" registry established with [RFC6755]: * URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:ckt * Common Name: COSE Key Thumbprint URI * Change controller: IESG * Specification Document: [[This document]] 9. Acknowledgements We would like to thank the authors of [RFC7638] for their work on the JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint specification. This document applies JWK Thumbprints to COSE Key structures. Additionally, we would like to thank Carsten Bormann, Ilari Liusvaara, Laurence Lundblade, Daisuke Ajitomi, Michael Richardson, Michael B. Jones, and Brendan Moran for their feedback. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, . Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 11] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 [RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012, . [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392, May 2018, . [RFC8747] Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March 2020, . [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, . [RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, . [RFC9053] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053, August 2022, . 10.2. Informative References [IANA.Hash.Algorithms] "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry", . [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, . Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 12] Internet-Draft COSE Key Thumbprint October 2023 [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, . [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September 2015, . [RFC9278] Jones, M. and K. Yasuda, "JWK Thumbprint URI", RFC 9278, DOI 10.17487/RFC9278, August 2022, . [RFC9360] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509 Certificates", RFC 9360, DOI 10.17487/RFC9360, February 2023, . Authors' Addresses Kohei Isobe SECOM CO., LTD. Email: isobekohei@gmail.com Hannes Tschofenig Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net Orie Steele Transmute United States Email: orie@transmute.industries Isobe, et al. Expires 25 April 2024 [Page 13]