Do not be alarmed.  I generated this review of this document as part
of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF
documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written
with the intent of improving security requirements and considerations
in IETF drafts.  Comments not addressed in last call may be included
in AD reviews during the IESG review.  Document editors and WG chairs
should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

This is specious reasoning about the security of symmetric keys when
used for authentication:
>  RADIUS has used shared secrets for thirty years,
>  and this vulnerability has not been known to be exploited.  As such,
>  we believe that this known issue is acceptable for TLS-PSK.
It's not just an "issue", it's a risk, and there must be a more
substantial justification than a belief bolstered by vacuity.

Perhaps the fact that the keys are shared in a "internal / secure"
network sufficiently mitigates the risk?  Other measures as well?